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* Associate  P rofessor, U niver sity of Minn esota  Law S chool. With sp ecial
thanks  to Pr ofessors Gr an t S. N elson a nd Willia m D. Wa rr en for t heir  valu able
c om m e n t s o n  a  dra ft of this  ar ticle a nd t o Em ily E. F lynn , Deidr e D. McGr at h, a nd
Thayer  H. Thompson for their a ble research a ssistan ce.
1. F o r ease  of referen ce, the  ter m “mort gage” will be use d th rough out t his
Article  to r efe r g en er ica lly t o al l for ms  of rea l est at e se cur ity . Alth ough  th e va ri ous
types of rea l estat e security an d the documen ts by which they ar e created differ,
those differences  ar e irr eleva nt t o the discussion in this Article, except wher e noted
otherwise.
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Third -Par ty Defenses to Mortga ges
An n M . Bu rkh art*
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 When  the  holder  of a  not e  a n d m or tgage 1 a s ser t s  it s rights,
well-esta blished law delinea tes wh at  defenses a re a vailable to
those who ar e liable for t he debt . However, in some cases a
person who i s not  lia ble  for  the d ebt—a “th ir d p ar ty” to t he loa n
t ransact ion—may ha ve a d efens e aga ins t t he h older’s a ction .
Alth ough  th e th ird pa rt y is not liable for t he debt , i t  may have
an  int ere st  in t he m ort gaged  lan d or in  th e mor tga ge its elf.
Unfortu na tely, th e law is n ot  nea r ly a s clea r  in  th is  si tua t ion .
The confus ion  a r i ses  in  la rge par t  because the  laws  concern ing
notes  and  mor tga g es  h a ve evolve d w it h  lit t le r ega rd for  ea ch
othe r , de sp it e t heir  close a ss ocia t ion  in  commer cia l t r ansa c-
tions.
To res olve th e conflict between  th e two bod ies  of la w, cou r t s
s t a t e th at , becau se t he  mor tga ge i s a  mere an cillary of the n ote,
it  s h ou ld be govern ed by the s am e law as  th e note—Article 3 of
the Un iform  Commer cial Code (UCC) or  t he com mon la w of
contr acts. This  re lian ce on comm er cial la w is comp let ely m i s-
placed when  decid in g is su es  concer n in g t it le t o la nd or  to a
mor tgage and leads to untoward r e su l ts . Althou gh comm ercia l
la w defines  wh ich  de fen se s a re a va ila ble  to a  pe r son  lia ble  on
the note, titles to land an d t o mort gages  ar e govern ed by t he
land laws  an d by t he r ecordin g acts  in p a r ti cu l ar . Pu r suan t t o
those l aws , a  th i rd pa r ty’s  cla im to l and or  to a  mor tgage is
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2. A seven th  categor y of case e xists , but it is so different  from the other
categories as to be inapposite. This category involves cases in  which a  th ird pa rt y,
such  as a  jun ior lien or, asser ts  t he  bor ro we r’s d efe ns es  ag ai ns t e nfo rce me nt  of th e
mortgage.  The  defen ses in clude fa ilur e of consider at ion, fr aud  in  the  inducemen t ,
expir at ion  of the s ta tu te of limit at ions, t he on e-action  ru le, un consciona bility, a n d
usu ry.  A lthough  th i rd pa r t ies have as se rt ed  th es e d efe ns es  ag ai ns t e nfo rce me nt  of a
mort gage  in  a  subs tan t ia l number  of  cases , the  g rea t  bu lk  of  these cases  involve  the
origina l mortgagee so th at n otice is not an  issue a s it  is in the other six categories.
Moreover, th ese  defe ns es d o not  address  ownersh ip of a mort gage or of the m ortgaged
land. Inst ead, th ey usua lly are ass erted  to prevent  eliminat ion of tha t ownersh ip
interest  by for eclosur e or  exe cut ion of a  sen ior l ien . Th er efor e, t he se ca ses  will n ot
be considered in the text of this Article. However, because they a re defenses asser ted
by third pa rties, th ey will be examined briefly in this footnote.
A purchaser of property subject to a mortgage generally is barred from ass ert ing
any defense of the original borrower when the purchase  price  fo r  the l and  was
reduced to reflect t he s ecur ed deb t. S ee GR A N T S. NE L S O N  & DA LE  A. WHIT MAN , RE A L
E STATE  F I N AN C E  LAW  § 5.1 7 (3d  ed . 19 94).  Addit iona lly, t hir d pa rt ies  us ua lly ca nn ot
as s er t  these  defense s aga inst  a h older in  due cour se becau se th ey nor ma lly are
cha rac te r ized as p ers ona l defen ses. See infra notes 10-1 1  a nd a ccomp an yin g te xt; see
als o, e.g., FDIC v. Wood, 758 F .2d 156 (6th  Cir. 1985) (usu ry); City Lu mber  Co. v.
Park , 58 P.2d 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (failur e of conside ra tion); Wilson Br os. v.
Cooey, 247 A.2d 395 (Md. 1968) (failure  of considera tion); Katz v. Simcha Co., 246
A.2d 555 (Md. 1968) (usury). On t h e other hand, when a n onholder in due course
holds th e not e an d mor tga ge, a t hir d par ty gener ally can  ass ert  th e following
defenses: (1) exp ir at ion  of the  sta tu te of limit at ions, see, e.g., Billingsley v. Pru itt, 291
S.W.2d 498 (Ark. 1956); Flack v. Boland, 77 P.2d 1090 (Cal.  1938);  Kaichen’s  Meta l
Mar t , Inc. v. Ferr o Cast Co., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233 (Ct. App. 1995); O’Neil  v.  Genera l
Secur i ty Cor p., 5 Cal. Rp tr . 2d 712 (Ct . App. 1992); (2) frau d in t he in ducem ent , see,
e.g., Kirk  v. MacDon ald, 48 3 N.E .2d 832 (Ma ss. App. Ct . 198 5); (3) paymen t  of  the
debt , see, e.g., Woods v. Bournes, 309 S.W.2d 309 (Ark. 1958) ; H a r t  v. Louis S. Le vi
Co., 22 N .E. 2d 3 0 (Ma ss.  1939 ); (4) th e for eclos ing  pa rt y doe s  n ot  o wn  t h e mortgage,
see,  e.g., V.S. Cook Lum ber  Co. v. Ha rr is, 71 P .2d 446 (Ok la. 1 9 3 7) ; a n d (5) the one-
govern ed by one criter ion—notice. That  one  factor  i s the correct
basis for decision in all the third-party defense cases.
II. CA TE G O RI E S  OF  TH I R D -P A R T Y  DE F E N S E  CA SE S
 Another  source  of confus ion  i n  t h ese cases is the morass of
fact s involved  in ea ch cas e. Becau se t he  case s a lmost  alw ays
involve fraud  or  other wrongful condu ct, the facts a re often
qu it e complica ted . Wr ongdoer s oft en  act  th rough  a  se r ies  of
nominees, des ignees, str aw people, and  shell corpora tions; en-
gage  in cond uct  th at  wr ongfully e na bles t he m t o collect p ay-
men t s on loa ns th ey no longer  own or t o sell th e same loan  more
t h a n  once; an d oth erw ise a ct t o obfus cat e an d cover t heir
tra cks. Howeve r, or der  does exi st  wit hin this chaos of facts.
Distilled to the ir  e ssen t ia l s, the t hird -part y defense cases
virtu ally all involve one of th e following six fact pat ter ns:2
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act ion  ru le, see, e.g., O’Neil v. Genera l Sec. Corp., 5 Ca l.  Rptr.  2d 712  (Ct . App . 19 92).
Som e courts ha ve character ized other defenses as being persona l to the borrower
and,  th ere fore, un ava ilable t o th ird p ar ties , includ ing u ncons cionabilit y, see, e.g.,
Coun ty of Tioga v. Solid Waste  Indu s., 577 N.Y.S.2d 922 (App. Div. 1991), an d failur e
of cons ide ra tion , see, e.g., 527-9 Lenox Ave. Realty Corp. v. Ninth  St. Ass’n, 606
N.Y.S.2d 699 (App. Div. 1994); County of Tioga v. Solid Waste In dus., 577 N.Y.S.2d
922 (App. Div. 1991). But see Ha rt  v. Louis  S. L evi  Co.,  22 N .E .2d  30 (M as s. 1 939 );
In  re Levine, 23 B.R. 410 (Bankr . S.D.N.Y. 1982). The defense that ha s caused the
greatest  division of aut horit y is usu ry. Th e ma jority of cases, in cluding m ost  of t he
more re cen t ca se s, ch ar act er ize  th e d efe ns e a s b ein g a  pe rs on al  de fen se  of t he
borrower tha t is una vailable to junior lienors . S ee, e.g.,  Federal Sav. & Loan Ins.
Corp. v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1991); Unit ed  Sta t e s  v.  Deser t  Gold Min ing
Co., 433 F .2d 713 (9t h Cir . 1970); Maes tr o Music, In c. v. R u d ol ph  W u rlitzer Co., 354
P.2d 266  (Ari z. 1 960 ); Sosin v . Ri cha rd son , 26  Ca l. R pt r.  610  (Ct . App . 19 62);
Commonwea lth  Tra i le r  Sa les  v.  Bradt, 87 N.W. 2d 705 (Neb. 195 8); Tann er v. Mobley,
354 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. 1962); Allee v. Benser, 779 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1988). Other
cour t s , however, permit jun ior lienors to assert t he defense of usur y, par ticula rly
when  the jun ior wants t o exercise its equity of redemption with r esp e ct  t o t h e sen ior
mortgage.  S ee, e.g., National Sur . Corp. v. Inland Properties, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 173
(E.D. Ark . 196 8); In re Langer, 6 F. Supp. 651 (E.D.N.Y. 1934); Fikes v. First Fed.
Sav.  & Loan  Ass’n, 533 P.2d  251 (Alask a 197 5); Cole v. Bansemer ,  26 Ind. 9 4 (18 66);
Broadhurst  v. Brooks, 113 S.E. 576 (N.C. 1922). In at least two stat es, us ur y is
classified as a  rea l defen se t ha t is a vaila ble even  aga inst  a h older in  due  cours e. S ee,
e.g., Andrews v. Martin, 436 S.W.2d 285 (Ark. 1969); Lucas v. Beco Homes, Inc., 494
S.W.2d 417  (Mo. C t.  App . 19 73).
A. Fraud
 
In  a  typica l fraud  case,  a  landowner  is frau dulen tly indu ced
to convey  t it le t o a  gr an tee  wh o then  give s a  mor tga ge on  the
land to se cur e a  debt . I f a  cour t  voids t he deed beca use  of th e
fr a u dulen t  conduct  and  the former  owner  the reby r eacqu ir es
title,  is  the t it le s t ill  en cumbered  by t he m or tga ge or  can  t he
form er  owner successfully assert t he fraud t o elimina te  the
mort gage?
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B. Resultin g Tru st
A resultin g tr us t is  crea ted  whe n a  lan downe r conveys t itle
to a  t rus tee  bu t  does  not  des igna te the  t rustee’s  s t a tus on  the
deed so tha t  the  deed  appears  to be an  ou t righ t conveyance of
fee title. Despit e th e failure t o express the tr ustee’s stat us on
the deed, t he t rust ee  holds t he p rope r ty in  t rust  for  the
ben eficiar y. If th e t ru st ee violat es t he  tr us t b y mor tga ging t he
land to secure a  persona l loan , can th e beneficiar y successfu lly
ass er t  th e existence of th e resu lting t ru st t o elimina te t he
mort gage?
C. Wr ongfu l R elea se by the Or igi nal  Mortgagee
 When  a n  assign ee fails  to r ecord a  mor tga ge assignm ent ,
the origina l mor t gagee still  appears from th e property records
to own the mor tgage . I f the  landowner  sel ls  the l and a fte r  the
ass ignment  and u ses the sa le p roceeds  to pa y t he d ebt  to the
origina l mortgagee in exchan ge for its execut ion  of a  mor tgage
releas e, is th e buyer’s tit le su bject t o th e mor tga ge? Simila rly, if
the land owner borr ows money to pay th e mort gage d eb t  and
gives a m ort gage t o secur e t he  new  loan , is t he  new  mor tga ge
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subject to the p r ior  mor tgage  or  i s the prior mortgage eliminated?
D. Wr ongfu l R elea se by a  Mortgagee th at  Acq uired  Fee T it le
This  category of cases is sim ila r  to the  th ird  ca tegory  bu t
differs  in lega lly sign ificant  wa ys. As in  th e la st  cat egory, the
origina l mor tga gee  pu rpor t s t o rele ase  a  mor tgage aft er h avin g
ass igned it to someone else. U n like th e last  category, however,
t he original mort gagee ha s acquir ed tit le to the en cumber ed
land after  assign ing th e mor tga ge. Becau se t he  mor tga ge
ass ignment  is u nr ecorded , th e origin al m ort gagee appea r s  t o
own  both  the  mor tgage  and the fee title t o the encum bered
land. Th er efor e, t h is  ca tegor y of case s impl ica tes  the d oct r in e of
mer ger, which  poten tia lly app lie s w hen  a  pe rson  own s m ore
than  one in te re st  in a  pa rcel of lan d. In  con t ras t, t he ca ses in
the th ird cat egory involve a writ ten  rele as e. As in the  preceding
cat egory,  th e issue in  th ese cases is wh eth e r  t he bu yer is
subject to the  mor tgage  or  can  us e  t h e wrongful release as a
defen se a gain st  it.
E. Mortgage as a Fraud on Creditors
This  typ e of case t ypically a rises wh en a  land owner
a t t empt s to sh elte r it s la n d  fr om  cred itor s by gr an tin g a
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3. S ee NELSON  & WHIT MAN , supra  not e 2, § 5.32. 
mor tgage in  favor  of an  a lly  for  lit t le or  no considera t ion . After
the mortgage is assigned, can it still  be invalidated as a
fraudu len t  conveyance?
F. Mortgage Assigned Tw ice
If t he  or igina l mortga gee assigns t he sa me m ortgage t wice,
which  assignee owns it? If one assignee brings an act ion  to
foreclos e the  mor tgage , can  the othe r  ass er t its  claimed
ownersh ip of th e mort gage as a  defense?
III. AP P R O A CH E S  F R O M  CO M M E R C I A L  LAW : TH E  CO M M O N  LAW
O F  CO N T R A C TS  A N D  UCC  AR T IC L E  3
 C ou r t s an d comm enta tor s  oft en  st a t e  t ha t  t he  answers t o
the ques t ion s p res en ted  by t hes e ca se s a re gover ned  by on e of
two bod ies of l aw—t he com mon la w of con t ract s or  Ar t icle 3  of
the UCC Article 3 applies if the note is a “n egotiab le
inst r u m en t” as defined by t he Code. The comm on law ap plies
other wise. As described below, th e comm on law an d Article 3
em ploy very differen t a ppr oaches to th e ava ilabilit y of defenses.
A. Com m on Law of Contracts
 Und er  t h e  com m on  law of con t ract s , defenses  to the not e
and mor tgage  a re d iv ided  in to “p a ten t  equ it i es” and  “la ten t
equ itie s.”3 This division is based on wh ose  de fense i t  i s t o
as ser t . The bor rower’s defenses a re called pat ent  equities
because  th ey ar e discovera ble by t he e xercise of rea sona ble
diligence. An  a s signee of t he  note  and mor tgage  knows the
borrower’s iden t it y; a ft er  a ll,  th is  is  the p er son  from wh om  it
exp ect s to receive loan payment s. Therefore, the th eory is that
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4. S ee, e.g., Dale A. Wh itm an , Reforming  the  Law: The  Paymen t Ru le as
Parad igm , 19 98  BYU  L. RE V. 1169.
5. S ee, e.g., In  re Levine, 23 B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Owen v. Evans,
31 N.E. 99 9, 1000-01 (N.Y. 1892); Trust ees of Union  College v. Wheeler , 16 Sickels
12 (N. Y. 18 74).
6. S ee, e.g., Bloom er  v. H en der son , 8 Mich . 395  (1860 ); Sim pson  v. De l H oyo,
94 N.Y. 189 (1883). 
the assign ee simply can ask  the borrower whether it  ha s any
defenses t o enforcemen t of the note or m ortgage.
Unfortu na tely, a s  happens too often  in  th i s hoary  a rea  of
law, practice has diver ged from  th eory. 4 The number  of
ou t s tand ing mor tga ge loans h as increa se d e xponen t ia lly  since
the e r a  dur ing which the pa tent /latent  distinction was dr awn .
Loans from around  the coun t ry  a re sold and  resold in  pools of
hundr eds or thousands on the seconda ry mor tgage  marke t .
Ra ther  than  ask  each  bor rower  whose loan  is  in  the p ool
whet her  it ha s an y defenses, seconda ry ma rk et pu rcha sers
typ ically r e ly on th e seller’s repr esent at ions an d war ra nt ies
tha t  no defenses exist . De sp it e t h is  t r ansfor mat ion  of th e
mor t gage ma rk et, which m ak es quest ioning each borrower
impr acticable, th e common la w of cont racts  su bject s  mor tgage
assignees to patent  equities.
In  con t r a s t  t o pa t en t  equ i ti es , latent equities are th ird -pa r ty
defenses. The y ar e lat ent  becau se t hey a re gen era lly
undiscoverab le by the exer cise of ordin ar y diligence. The
pr ospect ive mor tga ge as sign ee n orm ally will n ot kn ow th e th ird
pa r ty’s ident ity be cause , by  de fin it ion , t he t h ir d p ar ty wa s n ot
involved in  the loan  t ransact ion . Ther efore,  the a ss ign ee  cannot
inquire of the third part y whether it  has an y defenses.
Cour t s deciding cases  involving laten t equ ities ap pear  t o
reach  d ramatica lly differen t r esu lts . In s ome cas es, cour ts  hold
tha t  a m ortgage a ssignee is su bject  t o latent equities because
the origina l m ort gagee is  su bject t o th em; t he or igina l
mort gagee can  convey no g rea t er  righ ts  to en force th e m ort gage
than  i t  had.5 In oth er cases, court s categorically stat e th at
ass ignees ar e not su bject  to la t en t  equ it ies  beca use  of th e
difficulties tha t  other wise  wou ld  be  crea ted  for  pu rchase rs of
loans. 6 As will be described below, however , a sin gle
factor —notice—un ifies and h armonize s v ir tua lly  eve ry on e of
these cases.
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7. S ee U.C.C. § 3-1 04 (1995) (specifying the  requ irem ent s for a n egotiable
inst rumen t ).
8. S ee id . § 3-10 2(a ).
9. S ee id . § 3-30 5(a )-(b).
10. S ee 2 TH O M A S  D. CRANDALL ET AL ., UN I F O R M  COMMERCIAL CO D E  § 16.13.2
(199 6).  
11. S ee U.C.C. § 3-305(b) (1995). The D’Oench, Duhm e doctrine provides
equ iva len t protection to the F DIC and RTC. The United Stat es Supr e m e  Co u rt
created  th is federa l common la w doctrin e in D’Oen c h , Duhm e & Co. v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447 (1942). S ee also Res olut ion T ru st  Cor p. v. Maplewood Invs., 31 F.3d 1276,
1290-94 (4th Cir . 1994); Milligan v. Gilm ore Meye r, In c., 775 F. Supp. 400, 403-05
(S.D. Ga . 1991); Bar bar a A. Baile y, Giving D’Oench i ts  Due: A Comment on the
D’Oench , Du hm e Doct rin e Af ter  O’Melven y & Meyer s v. FD IC, 28  AR I Z. ST . L.J . 1259
(199 6); J . Micha el Ech evar ria , A P reced ent  Em bal m s a P rin cipl e: T he Ex pan sion  of
the D’Oench, Duhm e Doctrine , 43 CATH . U. L. RE V. 745  (199 4).
12. S ee 2 J A M E S  J . WH I T E  & ROBERT S. SUMMERS , UN I F O R M  COMMERCIAL CODE
B. Article 3 of the UCC
 If t he note conforms with the requirements of Article 3 of
the UCC, it  is a “negotiable inst ru men t”7 and  is  governed by the
prov is ions of the Code, ra th er th an  by the common law of
contr acts.8 Wit h  res pe ct  to de fen se s t o en force men t  of a
negot iable  ins tr um en t, Ar t icle 3 distin guishes  between  an
inst rument held by a h older in due cou rse  (HDC) and a n
inst rument held  by s omeon e who is  not a holder in due course
(non-HDC). A non-HD C is su bject  to a ll t he d efense s t ha t  can
be asser ted  under t he common law of contracts.9 The refore , in a
case involving a  non -HDC, a  court  will ap ply th e common  law
distinction between patent  and latent  equities.
In  con t r a s t , an  HDC i s i nsu la t ed from m a ny defenses.
Unl ike th e comm on law, which categorizes defenses as  pa ten t
or  la ten t  equ it ies,  Ar ticle 3 ca tegor ize s d efense s a s r ea l or
per sona l.10 Whereas the com mon la w’s di st in ct ion  is  ba se d on
whose defense it  is to assert,  Article 3’s d is t in ct ion  is  ba se d on
the type  of defense . The most se r iou s d efense s—t hose  tha t  go t o
the very heart  of the tr ansa ction’s validity—are real defenses,
such  as du ress , lack of legal capacity, and  illegality. The less
se r ious defenses, su ch as failur e of consider a t i on , a re  pe rsona l
defenses. An HDC is su bject only to rea l defenses. It  can
enforce th e ne gotiable in st rumen t  wit hout  be in g subject  to
persona l defenses.11 This special p rot ection for H DCs is
designed  to faci li t a te the  flow of cap ita l t h roughou t  t he coun t ry
by insulating secondary loan m arket  purchasers from most
defenses.12
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150 (4t h e d. 1 995 ).
13. Section  58 of the Uniform Ne gotiable Inst rum ents  Law (N.I.L.), which was
the immedia t e  p redecessor of Article 3, provided  th at  a n on-HDC of a n egotiable
inst r umen t “is s ub ject  to t he  sa me  de fen se s a s if i t w er e n on ne got ia ble .” 5 U .L. A.
§ 58 (1996). This pr ovision was  not lim ited e xpres sly t o  defenses of the obligor but
appa ren tly  inclu ded t hir d-par ty de fense s as  well. S ee J ames  J . Morr ison, Eq ui ties  of
Ownership  and E quities of Defence in Ov er d ue Paper, 5 TU L . L. RE V. 287, 297-301
(193 1).  But see Meriwether  v. New Orlean s Real Esta te Bd., 162 So. 208, 210-11 (La.
1935). In contra st,  section 57 of the N.I.L. provided that an H DC held the instrum en t
“fre e from defen ses a vailab le to pr ior par ties a mong t hemselves.” 5 U.L.A. § 57
(199 6).   This provision does not include th ird-party defenses.
When  Article 3 was promulgated in 1952 to replace th e N.I.L ., t he  mor e
expansive language of section 58 was replaced with langu age that  did not include
th i rd-pa r ty de fenses . Both  section 3-305(2), which dealt wit h HDCs , and section 3-
306 (b),  which dealt with n on-HDCs, provided only for “defenses of any par ty.” The
Code’s definit ion of “part y” expres sly exclud ed t hir d pa rt ies, see U.C.C. § 1-201(29)
(1952),  even th ough th e Official Comment  to section 3-306 states  tha t section 3-306(b)
mer ely “restates th e first sentence of the original [s]ect ion 58.”  U.C.C. § 3-306 (1997)
Official  Comment .
The origina l v er sion of Ar ticl e 3 w as  comp let ely r evis ed b y th e ve rs ion
promulgat ed in  1990.  The  1990  Officia l Edition p rov ision s con cer nin g H DCs  an d n on-
HDCs  aga in a ddr essed  only defens es “of th e obligor . ” U. C.C . § 3-3 05(a ), (b) (1 997 ).
Th ird -pa r ty defenses are not ment ioned.
14. S ee U.C.C. Art. III, Third P relimina ry Dra ft § 47 (F eb. 9-12, 1946), repr in ted
in  2 E.S. KEL LY & A. P U CK E T T , UN I F O R M  COMMERCIAL CODE : CONFIDE NTIAL DRAFTS
93, 154 (1995) [hereinafter  CONF IDE NTI AL DRAFTS]. Te nt at ive  Dr aft  No. 3, dated
August 20, 1947, changed th is language. It provided that  HDCs  took free fr om “all
defenses of any pa rt y” with t he e xception  of certa in en um era ted  defen ses. Reprinted
in  3 E.S. KELLY, UN I F O R M  COMMERCIAL CO D E  DR A F T S  357 (198 4).
15. 2 CONF IDE NTI AL DRAFTS , supra  note 14, at  349.
In  cat egorizing d efens es ba sed on  th eir s ubsta nce, rat her
t h a n  on t he p ers on a sser tin g th em, Ar ticle 3 overlooked  th ird -
pa r ty defen ses . Alth ough predecessor legislation appear ed to
ap ply to bot h obligors’ an d th ird pa rt ies’ defenses, Article 3’s
prov is ions concern ing rea l an d pe rs ona l defen ses  re fer on ly to
defenses  “of the obligor”; no other provision addresses th ird-
part y defenses.13
Art icle 3’s legisla tive h ist ory sh eds n o ligh t on t his issu e.
The available legislat ive histories for both th e 1952 and  1990
ver sions of Article 3  a re silent on the issue of third-part y
defenses. Al though  an early dra ft  of Ar t i cle 3  prov ided  tha t  an
HDC t ak es free of “all defenses” oth er t ha n a  few enum era ted
types  of defenses, th e Reporter ’s Note does not  indica te  tha t  the
d ra ft e r s consider ed th e issue of third -part y defe n ses.14 The
Reporter ’s Note for this sect ion  cont ains  th e only reference to
mortgages. I t  s t a tes t ha t on e su bsect ion of this  pr ovision “is
inten ded t o m eet  th e pr oblem of th e not e a nd  mor tga ge.”15
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16. S ee id . at 349-50.
17. Legislat ive h istory for th e UCC is scarce. Materials such a s unpu blished
proceedings, min ut es, an d deba tes concer nin g th e dra fting of th e UCC a re es sen tia lly
una vailable. S ee SP E C I AL I ZE D LEGAL RESEARCH  § 2 .4 .1 .,  a t 2-32 (Leah  F. Ch an in ed .,
199 7).  Th er efor e, t he  pr im ar y sou rce s for  int er pr et ing  th e dr aft er s’ int en t com es fr om
the text s of the Official Edit ions a nd t he pr elimin ar y dra f t s and  from the Off ic ia l
Comment s incl ud ed a fte r e ach  pr ovisi on in  th e t ext . Loca t ing even  these  sources  can
be difficult, becau se som e of the dr afts a re confiden tia l or oth erwis e un publis hed. S ee
id . § 2.4.1, at 2-31 & n.7, § 2.4.4., at 2-39 to 2-41.
18. U.C.C. § 1-20 1(37 ) (199 7).
19. S ee NELSON  & WHIT MAN , supra  note  2, § 5.31 n.13 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
However , th e dr after s’ concern  appea rs t o have been wh eth er
the pur chaser  of a n ote ca n  b e a n  HDC des pite kn owledge that
a  mort gage “pur ports  to affect t he n ote,” ra th er t han  with  the
issue of third-part y defenses.16
The app aren t  abs en ce of a ny m en t ion  of th i rd-pa r ty
defenses  may  be  a t t r ib u table  a t  lea st  in  pa r t  to the d ea r th  of
legisla tive  his tor y an d of publicly ava ilable m at eria ls in
pa r t icu lar .17 But  th e larger  problem—if n ot  t he  en t ir e
pr oblem—is th at  th e UCC an d th e com m on  l aw of mort gages
have rem ain ed la rgely s epa ra te b odies of law des pit e th eir  close
as sociat ion in com m e rcial tr an sa ctions . While m ort gage la w
readily t r aces it s lineage t o twelfth-centur y Englan d, Article 3
and it s p red eces sor , t he N egot ia ble  In st rumen ts Law (N .I.L.),
have t h orou ghly m odern ized a nd  codified t he la ws a ffectin g
negot iable  instrum ents. With r espect t o secur ity for t he debt
evidenced by the in str um ent , Article 3 was drafted to interm esh
with  Ar t icle 9 of th e UCC, which deals wit h secur ity int erest s
in  pers ona l propert y. However, Art icle 3 appea rs t o have been
dra fted with out  refer ence t o mort gage la w or t o land  law  m or e
gen er ally.  In fact, th e Code’s definit ion of “secur ity
in t er es t ”—“a n  i n t e r es t  i n  p e r s o n a l  p r op e r t y  or
fixtures”18—clearly  reveals t he Code’s disrega rd of real  est a t e
and mortgages.
IV. MA KI N G  TH E  LI N K: NO T I C E
 Because  negot iable  ins t rume n t s a n d  m or t ga ge s a r e so
frequ ent ly linked in pra ct ice,  cou r t s  have  had to find a  way to
harmonize  the law s gover nin g th em . To brid ge th e gap betw een
them, cour t s in  all bu t on e st at e hold t ha t a  negot iable
instr ument im pa r t s i t s q ua lit y of n egot ia bil it y t o the
mort gage.19 Cour t s  r e ason that because the mortgage is an
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Minnesota is the lone holdou t . S ee Lund berg v. North wester n Na t’l Bank, 216 N .W.2d
121 (Minn. 1974); John son v. H owe, 223 N.W. 148 (Min n. 1929). In  a few st at es in
wh ich  c ou r t s  a dh e r ed  t o t h e  m in o r ity position, the sta te legislature acted to adopt the
ma jor i ty ru le. S ee, e.g., LA. CIV. CO D E  AN N . ar t.  329 6 (We st  199 4) (Revision
Com me n t s-199 1);  OHIO RE V. CO D E  AN N . § 130 9.1 7 (We st  199 8) (Le gis la ti ve S er vice
Comm’n).
20. S ee, e.g.,  Ca rpen ter  v. Longa n, 83 U .S. 271, 275 (1872); Anchor Loa n Co. v.
Wi ll et t , 137 N.E.2d 532, 535 (Ohio 1956); First N at’l Bank v. Brother ton, 84 N.E. 794,
797 (Ohio 1908); Ashla nd B ldg. & Loan Co. v. Kerman , 155 N.E. 245, 246 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1926); Van Bur kleo v. Southwe ster n Mfg. Co., 39 S.W. 1085, 1088 (Tex. App.
189 6).
21. S ee, e.g., Car negie  Ban k v. Sh alleck , 606 A.2d 389, 400 (N .J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 199 2).
22. S ee Car pen ter , 83 U.S. a t 274. In  some s itua tions, however, the m ortgagee
would  be u n able t o execute  a jud gmen t a gain st t he la nd eve n if it could h ave
foreclosed its  mor tga ge bu t for  th e pe rs ona l de fen se.  For  example, in some states,
homes tead legislation permits the foreclosure of certain mortgages against a
homes tead but  will not pe rm it a  judgm ent  credit or to execu te it s lien a gain s t  t he
land. S ee 2 RICHARD R. P OWELL , P O W E L L O N  REAL P ROPERTY  § 18. 03(5 ) (199 7).
incident  of and  dependen t  on  the  debt, it  sh ould be e nforcea ble
to th e sam e extent  as t he debt .20 As  a  resu lt , cou r t s  s t a te tha t
th e mort gage is subject only to those defenses  available against
the not e. If th e not e is h eld by a n H DC, the mor tgage—like  the
not e—is in su la ted  from pe rson a l defense s.  Som e of t he cou r t s
protect ing mor tgages  in  th is  way express  an  int en t  t o faci li t at e
the seconda ry mort gage ma rk et by p r ot ecting its pu rcha sers
from defenses t o the m ortgages. 21
Extend ing the note’s pr otection s t o th e mor tga ge is
an alyt ically and p ract ica lly  sou nd w hen  de a lin g wi th  a  pe r son
who is  lia ble  on the n ote. I f the m or tga gee  could  su e on  the  note
free of a p er sona l defen se bu t w as  bar re d from  enfor cing t he
mor tgage becau se of it, t he  mort gagee usua lly cou ld ci rcumvent
th i s ru le b y ge t t in g a  judgmen t  on the n ote and  then  execu t ing
the judgment  aga inst  the  mor tgaged l and.22 The refore , to avoid
crea t ing both  a m ult iplicity of act ion s and  an  unseemly method
for  accompli sh ing indi rect ly tha t  which  cannot  be accompli shed
dir ectly,  it is best  to allow the m ortgagee t o e n for ce  the
mort gage free of defenses wh enever it  can en force th e note.
However , the s ame con side ra t ion s d o not  app ly w it h  res pe ct
to a t hir d pa rt y’s defen ses. F irs t, Art icle 3 does not  expr essly
cut  off a  th i rd pa r ty’s  defenses ; i t  expressly addresses  on ly the
obligor ’s defenses . Section 3-305(b) provides t ha t a n H DC’s
righ t  to enforce a n  in st rumen t  “is s ubject  to [rea l] defense s of
the obligor  . . . b u t  is  not  su bject  t o [pe rsona l ] defenses  of the
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23. U.C.C. § 3-30 5(b) (1 997 ).
24. S ee, e.g., Milligan v. Gilmore Meyer  Inc., 775 F. Supp. 400 (S.D. Ga. 1991);
Gribble  v. Ma ue rh an , 10 C al.  Rpt r. 2 96 (Ct . App.  1961 ); C it y  Lu m b e r  Co. v. Park, 58
P.2d 403 (Cal. Ct . App. 1936); Ha ywar d Lu mbe r & In v. Co. v. Naslun d, 13 P.2d 775
(Cal. Ct. App. 1932); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Berman In du s., 637 A.2d 1297, 1299
(N.J . Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck, 606 A.2d 389 (N.J .
Super . Ct . App.  Div. 1 992); Willett , 137  N.E .2d a t 5 35; N ort h  W. Mortgage Inv. Corp.
v. Slu mk osk i, 4 78 P .2d  748  (Wa sh . Ct . App . 19 70).
obligor .”23 An  a rgument  tha t  th i s l anguage subject s  an  HDC
only to th e obligor ’s r ea l defense s b u t , by  nega t ive  im pl ica t ion ,
not  to a  th ird  pa rt y’s defen ses is  exce ed in gly weak. Th e a bs en ce
of any r efe ren ce t o th ir d-p ar ty defense s in  Art icle  3 or  in it s
legisla tive  his tor y st ron gly sup port s t he conclus ion th at  Art icle
3’s dr a ft er s s im ply d id  not  conside r  the s it ua t ion  in  wh ich  a
th ird pa r ty has  a  cl a im to the mor tgaged l and or  to the
mort gage. This  omiss ion is u ns ur pr ising becau se Art icle 3 is
concern ed with actions on the note and n ot  with  act ions  on  the
mort gage.
Second, th e types  of defenses t ha t t he Code classifies as  rea l
or  pe r son a l r efle ct  a  fa ilu re t o conside r  cla im s t o mor tga ges  or
to m or t ga ged la nd . The r eal a nd  per sona l defens es de al wit h
s itua t ions su ch  as t he obligor ’s lack of capa ci t y a n d fraud  tha t
was exe rcised  upon  the obl igor . Th es e t ypes  of defenses a re
qua lita tively  different  th an  th e defen ses t ha t a ris e concern ing
t i t le t o t he  mor tgage  and to th e mor tga ged  la nd,  su ch  as
re su l ti ng t ru s t s and  merger .
However , th e most  imp ort an t r eas on t ha t Ar ticle 3 sh ould
not  be in terpreted to cut off third-party defenses is the
fundamenta l unfa ir nes s of e lim in a t in g a n  own er ’s t it le t o a
mor tgage or  to mor tgaged l and based on  a  loan  t r ansact ion  to
which  it was  not a  par ty. Absent a  clear express ion  of
legisla tive  int ent , th is out come sh ould n ot be consid ered a
possi bilit y. However, cour ts h ave sta ted  in a va riety of cases
tha t  a m ort gage is  su bject only t o rea l defenses and  not  t o
pers onal defens es wh en h eld by an  HDC. 24
An exam ina tion  of the se ca ses  re vea ls, h owever , th at
a l though cour t s  fr ame th e iss ue a s involvi ng a  rea l or  pe r son a l
defense, th e case actu ally is decided on a  differen t groun d–th e
pres ence or absen ce of notice of a conflicting inter est.
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25. S ee, e.g., Car pen ter  v. Longa n, 83 U .S. 271 (1872); Gr egory v. S ava ge, 32
Con n.  250,  261 (1864);  Jenks  v.  Shaw,  68 N.W. 900, 904 (Iowa 1896); Bell v. Canal
Bank & Trust  Co., 190 So. 359, 364 (La. 1939); Ames v. Miller, 91 N.W. 250 (Neb.
190 2); La nd is v . Rob ack er , 16 9 A. 8 91 (P a.  193 3).
26. S ee, e.g., H um ble  v. C ur ti s, 4 3 N .E . 74 9 (I ll. 1895); Robertson v. United
Stat es Live St ock Co., 145 N.W. 5 35 (Iowa 19 14); Bell v. Cana l Bank  & Tru st C o.,
190 So. 359 (La. 1939); Bloomer v. Hende rson, 8 Mich. 395 (1860); Smith v. Holdoway
Cons t . Co., 129 S.W.2d  894 (Mo. 1939); Knick meie r v. F leer , 185 S.W.2 d 57 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1945); Simpson  v. Del Hoyo, 94 N.Y. 189 (1883); North  W. Mortga ge In ves tor s
Corp. v. S lu mk osk i, 4 78 P .2d  748  (Wa sh . Ct . App . 19 70).
A. N oti ce as  th e Key  Elem ent
 By focusing on notice, the r esu lts in t he Art icle 3 cases
mi r ror  th e comm on law cases in wh ich cour ts a pply th e pat ent
and l a ten t  equ it y d is t in ct ion . In  bot h  the Article 3 cases and the
common la w ca s e s,  n ot ice or t he a bsence of notice dicta tes t he
resul t of th e case even  when  a  cour t  s t a tes  the i ssue as
involving a  rea l or  personal  defense, or a pa ten t or lat ent
equ ity.  Notice preser ves th e defense; absen ce of notice dest roys
it.
The followin g  discuss ion  of th e s ix ca tegor ies  of th ir d-p ar ty
defense cases dem onstr at es th at  notice is the k ey factor. The
necessa ry not ice ca n  be  actua l or  const ruct ive , such  a s  t ha t
provided by t he public la nd r ecor ds . In  fact , cou r t s  oft en  ci t e
th eir  concern  for th e int egr it y of t he la nd r ecor ds  as a  rea son
for  protecting both t he person who examined the records and
found no confl icting claim and th e person who recorded
evide nce of its  cla im.25 By p rotect in g t hose  wh o rely  on the
recor ds  and  by  rewarding t hose w ho r ecord eviden ce of th eir
interests, the court s are pur su ing a policy of ma kin g th e lan d
r ecords  as  complet e a nd  re liab le a s poss ible. In  some  case s, t he
pu rs uit  of this  policy injures an  other wise blameless  person, bu t
tha t  outcome is  not  un common  when  a  pa r t icu lar  community
good is viewed as  being more  impor tan t  than  p rotect ing any
given in dividu al.
1. Fraud
 In  virt ua lly ever y case  involvin g a deed, mort gage, or
mor tgage a s s ignmen t  obtained by frau d, courts have held that
the fraud  cou ld not  be asser ted  aga ins t  a  mor tgage ass ignee
tha t  did n ot h ave n otice of it.26 The r esult  is th e sam e whet her
the secured n ote is negotiable or nonn egotiable and  whet her  the
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27. 190 So. 3 59 (L a.  193 9).
holder  is  an  HDC or non-HDC. Courts r outinely give two
reasons for t his r esult . First , as bet ween  t h e  pe r son  who was
defrau ded and  the innocen t  ass ign ee , t he for mer  is  more
culpa ble becau se it  was  a p ar ticipa nt , albeit  un witt ingly, in  th e
fraud. As  the less culpable party, the assignee is protected.
Second, cour t s st res s t heir  conce rn  for t he r eli abil it y of the
record ing system. Because the fraud cou ld not be discovered
from an  examin at ion of th e propert y records, an in nocent
ass ignee ta kes t itle to th e mort gage free of th e defense.
Cour t s ad her e to t his  ru le even  whe n fa cing very har d facts,
as vividly illust ra ted  by Bell  v.  Canal  Ban k  & T ru st  Co.27 In
Bell, Ma nuel B ell  and h is  br other , P lea sa n t , own ed  for ty
a rpen t s of land as t enant s in common. Manuel Bell owned an
undivided one-four th  in teres t , and  P leasan t  Bel l owned  the
remain ing th ree-four th s int erest . When t he pr operty  t axes were
due each year, the Bells contr ibuted their respective shares,
and one of th em wou ld  go t o the sh eriff ’s office to pay the taxes.
When  Plea sa n t  Bell m or tga ged  h is  th ree-four ths i nt ere st  t o
Joseph Staring, Staring took responsibility for paying Pleasant
Bell’s sha re of the ta xes in order t o protect th e mort gage lien.
Th e firs t  yea r  tha t  S ta r ing  took  over  P leasan t  Be ll ’s  t ax
paymen t , Man uel Bell went t o the sh eriff ’s office to pay his one-
fou r th sha re of the ta xes. The sher iff re fused t o accept h is
par t ia l paymen t . Therefore, Man uel Bell and  Sta ring a greed
tha t  Bel l wou ld  give  St a r in g one-fou r t h  of th e ta xes each year
and t ha t  St a r in g wou ld  de live r  the t ax pa ym en t  to the sher iff.
Two years after this agreement, Sta r i n g deliberat ely failed
to pay t he t axes, th ough he a ccepted Man uel Bell’s paym ent ,
and bought  the p roper ty  a t  the resu l t ing  t ax sa le. Manu el Bell
was given no direct notice of th e sa le and rema ined u na war e of
it.  For t he n ext fifteen  years, he con t in ued  pa yin g h is  sh are of
the t axes to S t ar in g a nd t hen , a ft er  St a r in g’s d ea th , t o h is  son
who inherited th e  pr oper ty. S ta r in g’s s on  ga ve a  mor tga ge on
the property, which was assigned to Cana l Bank . When  the
loa n  went  in to de fau lt , Ca na l Ba nk bega n  a  foreclos ure a ct ion .
Man uel Bell defended against the  act ion  by a rgu ing  tha t  the
mor tgage was fr audu len t ly gi ven  wit h  res pe ct  to h is  one-fou r th
interest  because S ta r ing’s  son  knew tha t  he owned only a th ree-
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28. Id . at 364.
29. Id .
30. Pur suan t to Louisiana’s public records doctrine, possession does n o t  provide
constr uctive  not ice. S ee Manion v. Pollingue, 524 So. 2d 25, 34 (L a.  Ct . App . 19 88);
Max Na th an , J r.  & An th ony P . Dun bar , The Collateral Mortgage: Logic and
Ex peri ence , 49 LA. L. RE V. 39,  44 n .22  & 45  n. 23 (1 988 ).
31. Bell, 190 So. at 364.
32. 8 Mich . 39 5 (18 60).
33. Id . at 405.
four ths int e res t . Even  though  the  Sta r ings  had commi t ted a
“ter rible  fraud  and  in just ice”28 upon “appa ren tly un informed
people [who] tr us ted  th e St ar ings  an d pla ced imp licit  fa i th  in
th eir  honesty  and  in t egrit y,”29 and even though the Bells had
lived on  the  land for  sixty-five years,30 t he  cour t  he ld  tha t  Cana l
Ban k was n ot subject to th e frau d defense. The court  rea soned
tha t  the Bells could have prot e cted  them se lves fr om the
Star ings’ wron gdoing by check ing the pr operty r ecords  or by
demanding to see the paid tax receipts. Because th ey failed to
do so, they could not  a ssert  a defense a gainst  th e innocent
mor tgage assignee that ha d relied on the p ublic propert y
records. “[I]t was d u e t o [th e Bells’] fault  th at  th is dep lora ble
and unfor t u n a te situ at ion was m ade possible an d as bet ween
th ese vict ims and  the bona  fide  pa r t i es  who dea l t  wi th  the
p roper ty on  the  fa i th  of the pu blic records , they mus t  bear  the
loss.”31
The cour t  in  Bell im pos ed  a  h igh  st anda rd of ca re on  the
p roper ty owner. Though t he Bells wer e un aw ar e of an y cha nge
in  the property title and were undis t u r bed in  thei r  possess ion ,
t he cour t  sa id  tha t  they  were a t  fau l t  for  fa i ling to e ithe r  check
the property records or dem an d pr oduct ion of the t ax r eceipt s.
Not  sur prisin gly, th en, cour ts d o not perm it a fra ud defe n se in
the more  usua l  case in  which  t h e  defra ud ed own er k nowin gly
executed an d delivered a  deed  or m ort gage. F or exa mp le, in
Bloom er v. Hend erson ,32 a landowner was the subject of a “gross
fraud”33 t ha t  caused  h im to convey h is  p roper ty to a  person  who
subsequen tly gave a mortgage. The mortgage was assigned to
a n  innocent a ssignee. The court  held t ha t t he m ortgage cou ld
not  be invalidated on the basis of fraud for  th e sam e two
reasons given in  Bell: (1) as bet ween a n inn ocent  assign ee and a
land owner  who acted car elessly, the a ssignee sh ould be
p rotected; a n d (2) a  pe r son  wh o reli es  in  good fa it h  on the
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34. S ee, e.g., Gr egor y v. S av ag e, 3 2 Con n.  250 , 26 2 (18 64);  Ame ri can  Met ro.
Mortgage, Inc. v. Maricone, 423 So.2d 396 (Fla. Dis t . C t . App. 1982); Woodbury v.
Con ne cti cut  Mut . Life In s. Co., 166 S.W.2 d 552 (Mo. 1942); George F .  Per ry  & Sons
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proper ty record s sh ould be p rot ected . This  out come is
consi s tent  with t he decisions in every jurisd iction except New
York .
2. Resultin g trust
 Cour t s have been as u nyie ld in g t o cla im s b y be nefici a r ies  of
resul t ing tr ust s as t hey ha ve been to vict im s of fr aud.  As  in  the
fraud cases , cour t s  have  protected  a  person  who purchased  land
or  a  m or t ga ge from a  t rus tee  when  the purchaser  d id  not  have
not ice of th e beneficiar y’s int erest .34 Also like the frau d cases,
cour t s often  expr ess  an  overr idin g concern  wit h p rot ectin g th e
lan d r ecordin g syst em a nd  th ose wh o rely on it .
Cour t s ha ve been  equ ally r e si st an t  t o cl a ims  by  ve ry
sym pa th etic benefici a r ies  as t o claims by victims of frau d.
N orth  Western  Mort gage Investors v. S lumkosk i35 p r esen t s  fact s
as compellin g as  th ose in Bell, an d, a s in  Bell, t h e  cou r t  up held
the  mor tgage assign ee’s r igh t  to foreclose . In  Slumkosk i, Bessie
Slumkoski he ld  t it l e to he r  pa re n t s’ home in a resulting trust
for  th em . Her p ar ent s were sixt y-nine an d sixty-seven years
old, ha d four th -grade edu cations, wer e unfami li a r  wi th  lega l
m a t ters, and were in poor health. When they want ed to
purchase th e home, they did not h ave $500 for t he down
paymen t . Ther efor e, S lu mkos ki  ga ve t hem  $50 0 a s a  gift  and
took t i t le  in  he r  name.  Her  pa re n ts p a id  the ba la nce of t he
p u r chase price over t ime an d lived continu ously in th e hom e.
Slum koski never  lived ther e.
Slumkoski su bs equen t ly was indu ced  to bu y a  la undr omat
by fr audu len t  r ep resen tat ions  and  concea lment . Dur ing  the
sa le negotiat ions, the selle r asked Slumkoski if she owned any
pr oper ty.  When she re plied t ha t s he d id n ot, th e seller  as ked  if
she had a ny proper ty  in  he r  name.  She  told h im about  he r
parent s’ hom e. At t he h ear ing, Slu mk oski t est ified tha t  a t  the
closing, th e seller ha d her  sign severa l paper s. When sh e ask ed
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him what  the pape rs w er e, h e s a id : “Th is is ju st  a form alit y,
just a bu sin ess  agr eem en t.”36 On e of th e pa per s wa s a  mor tga ge
on her  pa ren ts ’ hom e, which  th e seller  sold to t he foreclosin g
ass ignee. S lumkosk i t estified tha t  she had  known tha t  she  was
sign ing a pr om i ss or y  note  bu t  tha t  she had  not  known tha t  she
was sign ing  a  mor tgage . Her  mother  t es t ifi ed  tha t  she had  not
au th orized Slu mk oski t o mort gage  t h e home a nd h ad been
unaware of the  t r ansact ion .  She  did not  t e ll  her  husban d about
bein g ser ved wit h a  complain t  in  the foreclosure action “because
he  wa s su fferin g from h ea rt  dise as e.”37
In  deciding wheth er t o pre ven t  t he foreclosu re,  the  cour t
ass um ed t h e strongest facts in favor of the property owners. It
a ssu med  that  Slumkoski held title to the home as a resul t i ng
tr ust ee, th at  her  par ent s ha d not a ut horized h e r  t o us e th eir
home as collateral for a loan, and tha t she ha d been
fraudu len t ly induced to pu rch ase t he la un dr oma t. De spit e
these fact s , t he  cour t  held t ha t t he m ort gage a ssign ee could
foreclose. Unlike Bell, h owever , t he cou r t ’s d ecis ion  on these
fact s w a s incor rect .  The  cour t ’s  op in ion  demons t ra tes  the
dan ger  crea ted  by a cour t’s a pplica tion  of the la w govern ing
negot iable  in s t r u ment s wh en d ealin g with  mor tga ges a nd  lan d
titles.
Because  the promissory note signed by Slumkoski was a
negot iable  in st rumen t , t he cou r t  st a ted  tha t  the m or t gage
should share the  note’s imm un ity to defenses. The court  th en
quoted  from the s t a tu tory definition of a “holder in  due course”;
to be an  HDC, th e mort gage assign ee “mus t  have  t aken  the
mor tgage (a rmed  with  the  im m u n i ties  of negot ia bil it y) wi thout
not ice of an y ‘de fect  in  the t it le of t he person negot iat ing it .’”38
Sta t e law defined “notice” as  a ct u a l notice and n ot mer e
const ru ctive notice.
The cour t’s relian ce on t his portion of th e HDC defin it ion
was mistaken in t wo ways. First,  the quoted l a n gu a ge dea ls
with  t i tl e t o t he  note , r a the r th a n  with  a d efens e to it s
en forcemen t . En tirely different  provisions in th e sta te’s
commer cial law d eal w ith  the ava ila bil it y of defense s.  Th e cou r t
ser iously compounded  th is e r ror  by then  app lying t he p rovis ion
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t o det er min e t itle  to t he  lan d. The court  rea soned th at  even
though s t a t e l aw  t re a ts poss ession  of lan d a s pr oviding
cons t ruct ive not ice to m ort gagee s, t ha t la w did  not  ap ply.
Instead,  th e cour t h eld t ha t t he  mor tga ge ass ignee  was an H DC
a n d could  foreclos e beca use  it  did n ot  have a ctua l n ot ice of t he
paren t s ’ possess ion .
The cour t ’s  r easoning is funda men ta lly flawed. The
ext en sion  of t he  note ’s  immunity  from defen ses  to t he  mor tga ge
only pr eve nt s a  la ndow ner  from cha llen ging a  foreclos ure a ct ion
on the ba sis t ha t  the n ote is  unen force able  beca use  of failur e of
consider a t ion  or som e oth er p ers ona l defens e. The  law
concern ing negotia ble instr um ent s does not a pply when
dete rmin ing own er sh ip  of mor tgaged  land. Land titles are
deter mined by the la nd la ws. Unlike Bell, which  ar ose in a
s t a t e where  possess ion  does  not  provide const ru ctive notice,39
Slumkosk i a rose  in  a  ju r isdict ion  in  wh ich  pos se ss ion  does
pr ovide not ice , including to a m ortgagee. 40 On  tha t  bas is , the
cour t  sh ould  have p reve nted  the for eclos ure. B eca use  the cou r t
instead focused  on  the  negot i ab le  in s t rumen t s  law , i t  r eached
an  in cor rect  res u lt  wit h  de va st a t in g con se qu en ces  for  the h ome
owners .
Fort un at ely, othe r  cour t s  cons ider ing resu l t ing  t rust s  have
r e a ched th e corr ect res ult  by relying on th e lan d laws . Cou r t s
rout inely hold tha t  a  mor t gage h older w ith  act ua l or
cons t ruct ive not ice of  a  res u lt in g t rust  is  bou nd by it . If t he
mor tga ge holder  did  not  have notice of the r esult ing tr ust  when
it  acqu ir ed  t h e mor tga ge, it own s it  free of th e ben eficiar y’s
interest. The  r es u lt is the same wheth er the tr ust property is a
mor tgage41 or  the  mor tgaged l and.42
3. Wr ongfu l relea se by the origin al  m ortgagee
 When  a  m or t ga ge e e xe cu t es a  re lea se of a m ort gage  after
hav ing as sign ed it  to someone else, courts normally hold that
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t h e relea se  is  effect ive  wh en  a  pu rchase r  of the la nd or  a
subsequen t mort gagee did not h ave notice of t h e  assignm ent .43
In  reach ing th is r esu lt, cour ts  expr ess a n over rid ing concer n  for
the record ing sys tem . For e xam ple, in  Jenks v.  Shaw,44 t he
cour t  held tha t  a pu rchase r  of la nd w ho reli ed  on an  ap pa ren tly
valid  rele ase  from the or igina l m or tga gee  acqu ir ed  t it le fr ee  of
the mor tga ge. Th e cour t fir mly gr ounde d i t s h old in g on  the
ne cessit y for pr otect ing t he  re cordin g act ’s in te grit y.
T h e policy  of o u r  r e gi st r y  la w s  is  t h a t  t h e  r eco rds  sha l l  d i sclose
t h e t r u e cond i t ion  o f l ands  a s  t o  t i t l e  and  incum bran ces . These
l a w s a re  for  t he  p r o tec t ion  o f a l l  conce rned  in  l and s ,  and  th ey
sh ou ld a n d d o ap ply  to t ra n sfer s of m ort ga ges  as  we ll a s t o th e
mor tga ges t h e m s e lv e s.  It  is  n o  gr e a t e r  h a r d s h i p t o  r eq u i r e t h e
ass ignee  o f a  m or tgage  t o re c or d  t h e  a s s ig n m e n t  t h a n  t o
re qu ir e  t h e  m ort ga gee  to r ecord  his  m ort ga ge. Th e r ecord  in
b ot h  cas es  is e qu al ly d em an de d for  t h e  p r ot ection  of per son s
h a v i n g  d e a li n g s  w it h  t h e  l a n d . 45
One cour t  in  pa r t i cu lar  has  re pu dia te d st ron gly th e
applicabilit y of the UCC in cases involving land titles. In
Federal Lan d B ank  v. Corinth Ba nk  & Tru st  Co. ,46 an  owner  of
mor tgaged l and bor rowed m oney t o pa y off an  exi st in g loa n  and
gave  a m ortgage t o secur e  t he new loan. The owner  an d lender
had no not ice th at  th e m ort gage  ha d been a ssigned becau se th e
ass ignment  was u nr ecorded . The ow n er  pa id  the or igina l
mort gagee, an d t he  mor tga gee executed a  release. In a
subsequen t action to foreclose the m ortgage, th e assign ee
ar gued that  because it  was an H DC, it  was not  subject  to the
persona l defense of paymen t . In  holdin g th at  th e m ort gage
r e lease was effective, the court  clearly and  corr ectly reject ed
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app lica t ion  of the la w of negot iable in st ru men ts  in  dete rmin ing
title to land:
[A]s  a  m a t t e r  of n otice t o su bse qu en t p ur cha ser s, it is
i m m a t er ia l whe th e r  t h e r ecord  sh ows t ha t t he  not e se cur ed is
n e gotia ble  or n on n egot ia ble . Ver y clea rly , th e qu es tion  doe s
n ot  in volve  th e r igh ts  of a h olde r in  du e cou rs e of n egot ia b l e
pape r  .  . .  , bu t  on ly  the  effect  of t he  pa pe r  a s  v i s ib l e  no t ice  to a
s u b s e q u e n t  p u r c h a s e r  t h a t  i t  m a y  h a v e  b ee n  t r a n s f e r r e d .47
At  lea st  two ju r isdict ion s h ave cr ea ted  an  exce pt ion  to the
genera l ru le  t ha t  a  r e lease  from th e  or igina l mor tga gee is
effective if the mortgage assignment  is  unrecorded . In  Kalen v.
Gel d erm an ,48 the South Dakota Supr eme Court  held that a
mort gagee tha t  pe r son a lly  su pe rvis ed  the p ayoff of a  se n ior
mor tgage w a s not  pr otect ed  from an  unrecor de d a ss ign men t  of
it.  Sim ilar ly, in Metropolitan L ife Insu rance Co. v. Guy,49 t he
Alabama  Su pr eme  Cour t h eld t h a t  a pur chaser  of encum bered
land tha t  required tha t th e mortgage be discharged as a
pr econdit ion to pu rchasing wa s n ot  pr otect ed  from an
un recorded assignment. In both cases, the court reasoned that
a  pe rson  res pon sible  for a  loa n  pa yoff has a  d u t y t o in si st  on
pr oduct ion of the n ote a nd  mor tga ge. By failing t o do so, th e
ba lancing of the  equ itie s sh ifted  in fa vor  of t h e relatively less
blameless ass ign ee . In  cont rast , a  su bs equen t  pu rchase r  of th e
land or  mort gage would be protected by t he wr ongfully executed
re lease . A per son  who was not  a  pa r ty to the loa n  pa yoff ca nnot
be expected to dema nd t o see notes secured  by a mort gage t ha t
appears from the property records to have been released.
An a l t erna t ive  ra t iona le for  t hese  cases  tha t  is  more
consis ten t with  record ing  act  r eason ing i s tha t  a  subsequen t
pur chaser  ha s const ru ctive notice n ot  on ly of r ecor de d
document s, but also of any mat ters th at  would  be r evea led by a
rea sona ble in qu ir y. Dem anding produ ct ion  of a  note  and
mor tgage as  a  cond it ion  of a  loa n  payoff rea sonably could be
cons t rued as being with in th e scope of inquiry notice. As wit h
the bala ncin g of equit ies a ppr oach em ployed by t he cour ts  in
Kalen and  in  Guy, th e du ty of inqu iry wou ld n ot r equire a
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subsequen t purchaser  to demand  to see  a  not e a nd  mor tga ge
tha t  pr eviously h ad  been  disch a r ged. Th e ben efit of th is
recor din g a ct  r a t ion a le over  the ba la ncin g of eq u it ies  app roach
is tha t  i t  more  di rect ly addresses  the notice aspect of third-
pa r ty defense  case s r a ther  than  crea t in g a  sp ur iou s e xcep t ion .
Of course,  nei ther  the  record ing  act  r a t iona le nor  the
balan cing of the equ ities ra tionale a pplies if the  st a te  record ing
act  does not include m ortgage a ssignm ent s. In t hose few stat es
in  wh ich  ass ign men ts a re n ot  inclu de d,  the a bs en ce of a n
assignmen t  from the  pub li c r ecords  does not  p rot ect  a
subsequen t pur chaser  or mort gagee th at  relies on  an
ap pa ren tly  valid recorded release.50 Inst ead, a  recorded
mor tgage tha t  has n ot  pr eviously be en  sa t is fied  of recor d gives
not ice tha t  the  mor tgage  is  an  ou t s tand ing  li en  tha t  ca n  be
releas ed only by it s a ctua l owner an d not by its r ecord owner .
Sim ilar ly, even in t hose sta tes in  which mort gage ass ignmen ts
a re included in  th e recording act, a wr ongful release will be
effective only if it complies with t he st a t u tory requirements for
a r elease. 51
4. Wr ongfu l relea se by a  m ortgagee th at  acq uired  fee t it le
 The cases i n  t h is  cat egory arise wh en a  mort gagee acquires
fee title t o the mort gaged lan d after  assign ing th e mort gage an d
th en  pu rpor t s t o convey t he fee  t it le fr ee  of th e lie n . Although
th i s cat egory is sim ilar  to t he p reviou s one, it  differ s in two
sign ifica n t  res pe ct s.  F ir st , wh en  an  app aren t  mor t gagee
acquires  fee tit le, th e doctr ine  of mer ger  becomes r e levan t .
Pursuan t to the doctrine of merger, when  one person holds two
i n tere st s in  proper ty  in  the  same r igh t  and withou t  an
int erve nin g in ter es t , t he t wo in ter es t s w ill  coales ce in to one
unless th e holder int ends t o keep th em  d is t inct .  Thus , when  a
mor tgagee acqu ire s fee t itle  to t he  mor tga ged la nd , th e
mor tgage  can  merge into the fee and be extinguished.52 Second,
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the pr ior cat egory of cases  norm ally involves a wr itten
mor tgage re lease . Because th e case s in  ca tegor y fou r  rely  on
mer ger, no writ ten  rele as e is given  an d r ecorded . The following
ana lysis of t he  cases  in  th is  ca t egory  wil l demons t r a t e the
im por tance of t hes e t wo fa ctors.
The cases  demons t ra t ing  th is  four th  fact  pat ter n h ave been
described as  “divide d.”53 On t heir fa ce, th ey do ap pea r t o be in
conflict . The conflict stems in large part  from a  di ffer en ce in  the
court s’ an a lysi s of t he  mer ger  iss ue . In  th e m ajor i ty  of cases,
the cour t s  hold tha t  when  the p roper ty records  ind ica te  tha t  the
origina l mort gagee owns  the fee title an d th e mort gage, merger
“pres um pt ively” applies, and th e mortgage is extinguished.
Many case s b u t t ress t his  conclusion wit h t he fa ct t ha t, in
response to an  inqu i ry by the  bona  fide  purchaser ,  the
mort gagee/owner  repr esent ed th at  th e mortga ge was  n o longer
a  lien.54 Some cour t s  a lso ana log ize th i s type  of case to the
prev ious category of cases.55  They rea son th at  because a
mor tgage releas e from a m ortgagee t ha t does not h ave fee t i tle
is effective, the res ult s hould n ot be differen t wh en t he
mort gagee owns th e fee.
In  cont rast , cou r t s h old in g t ha t  the m or tga ge i s n ot
extingu ished  ta ke a contr ar y view of the issu e of mer ger and of
the lan d pu rch as er’s dut y of inqu iry. These cour ts  gener ally
take a  na r rower  approach  to the  is sue of mer ger. They  hold tha t
because  th e origina l mortgagee did not in fact own the
mor tgage an d t he  fee tit le a t t he  sa me  tim e, m erger could  not
ap ply and, therefore, the mortgage was not extinguished.56
Alth ough  th eir view of mer ger  is  crabbed , t heir  concep t ion  of
the buye r’s dut y of inquir y is qu ite  expa ns ive. These cour t s
s t a t e t ha t b ecau se t he  mor tga ge is u nca ncelled  of record, t he
pr ospect ive l and purchaser  is on notice that  the mortgage is a
lien in the  hands  of anyone  to whom i t has  been  t r ans fe r r ed
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assigned  i t s mor tgage to  a t h i rd pa r ty and  subs e qu e n t l y a cqu ir ed fe e t itl e t o th e
mortgaged  lan d. Be cau se t he  as sign me nt  wa s u nr ecor ded , th e or iginal m ortgagee
appear ed to own the fee title and the mortgage. A subsequen t  mor tgagee a rgued tha t
the prior mortgage merged into the fee and was extinguished.
61. Unless a purchas e agreement  for land expressly provides oth erw ise, a
purcha ser  is ent itled t o receive m ar ket able t itle, wh ich is  a  t i t le t ha t is  fre e of
quest ion . S ee 4 AME RICAN  LA W  OF  P ROPERTY , A TREAT I S E  O N  TH E  LA W  OF  P ROPERTY
IN  T H E  UNITED ST A T E S  § 18. 7, a t 6 70 (A.  Ca sn er  ed ., 1952 ).
and mu st  ma ke a n a ppr opria te in quir y concer nin g its
ownership.57
The focus on  mer ger  and on  the r ela ted  issu e of t he d u ty of
inqu iry has led courts following both the majority and minorit y
pos it ions seriously astray. As stat ed in the Restat emen t  of
Mortgages, t he  doct r ine  of merger s hou ld not  apply to
mor t gages.58 Th is  conclu sion  is  su pp or ted  by a  wid e va r iet y of
considerations.59 Of perha ps m ost import an ce in the con t ext  of
wrongfu l rele ase s i s t ha t  mer ger  is  in con s is t e nt  with a  system
of recorded docum ent s, because m erger is p rim ar ily a mat ter  of
in ten t . Gener ally, the int erests  will merge only if th e owner so
in ten ds . As st a ted  by t he Wiscon sin  Su pr em e Cour t :
T h e r e cor d in g act  wa s n ot p as sed  for th e pu rp ose of en ab ling  a
prosp ect ive pu r chase r  t o  judge  for  h im se l f whe th e r  t h e re  ha s
been  a  m e r g er  of tw o ou ts ta n din g es ta te s. . .  . Wh et he r t he re  is
a  m e r g e r  or  n o t  oft en t im es  de pe n ds  u pon  cons ide ra tion s
e xt r a n eou s  [to] t h e  r ecord.  .  . .  To perm it  th e pr ospect ive
pur chase r  t o  co n cl u s iv e ly  d ecide  for  h im se l f whe th e r  a  m erge r
of t h e t w o  i n t e r es t s re su lte d fr om  th e ex ecu tion  an d d eliv er y of
a  de ed  from  t he  o r ig in a l  m or t g a go r t o t h e  a p pa r e n t  r eco rd
ho lde r  o f t h e  m o r t g a g e  is  g oi n g  fa r t h e r  t h a n  w a s  i n t e n d e d  b y
t h e  r e co r d in g  a ct .60
Rather  th an  rely on a mortga ge owner’s off-record int ent
concern ing th e lien’s cont inu ed vit alit y, recording acts provide
on-recor d methods for  rele asing m or tga ges . De pe nding on  the
s t a t e sta tu te, a m ortgagee can  releas e a m ortgage by record ing
a  rele ase  docu men t  or  by m akin g a  nota t ion  on  th e recorded
mort gage. In  fact ,  a  cour t  normal ly  wi ll  t r ea t  a  p roper ty  t it l e a s
bein g unm arket able unless the mortgage release appears  in  the
pu blic p roperty records.61 Th er efor e, in  the in ter es t s of
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pr otect in g t he r eli abil it y of the propert y records, merger  shou ld
be i r relevan t  in  dete rmin ing whether  the origina l mortga gee’s
wrongful releas e is effective to discha rge th e mort gage lien.
For  the s ame r ea son , t he la nd p urchase r ’s inqu ir ies  or  lack
of inqu irie s concer nin g th e  st a t us  of the m ort gage a lso sh ould
be irrelevan t. Fir st, wh at ever facts t he bu yer could discover by
such  a n  in qu ir y s t ill  wil l n ot  app ea r  on the p rope r ty r ecor ds .
The cont rolling rule of law for th ese ca ses should p romote a
pu blic record of the mortgage’s st a t us . Second , the  record ing
act ’s ba sic ope ra t in g pr in ciple is  to su bor dina te a ctua l
ownersh ip to t he a ppea ra nce of owner sh ip on t he r ecords; t his
pr inciple  p rov ides  the ca r rot  (or  st ick) for a p er son a cquir ing a n
interest  in l and to make  it  a  mat te r  of publ ic record . Th ird , the
du ty of inquir y has  never been  extend ed to requ ir e a
pr ospect ive pu rch as er t o ask  an  ap pa ren t own er w het her  it
really owns tha t  in t e res t ; i ns t ead,  the  du ty a pplie s only t o
n on r ecord mat ter s,  su ch  as t he r igh t s of a  pe r son  in  pos se ss ion
whose int er est  does n ot a ppe ar  on t he  pu blic pr oper ty r ecords.
Fin ally,  if the  origina l  m or t gagee is willing to give a deed that
pu rpor t s t o convey fee title free of the m ortgage, th e mort gagee
seems un lik ely  to adm it  the fr aud in  res pon se  to the b u yer’s
inq uir y. I f the  mor tgagee asser t s  tha t  it  has  d es t r oyed the  note
a n d m ortgage, th e buyer would n ot know of whom to inquir e
fur the r because t he a ssignee’s ident ity cann ot be discovered
from th e propert y records. For th ese rea sons, th e buyer’s
inquir ies or lack of inquir y should be irr eleva nt  in de ter min ing
whether t he mortgage is extinguished.
The major i ty of cour t s ’ ana logies t o the  cases  in  the  th i rd
ca tegor y also is misplaced. As st at ed a bove, some cour ts  holdin g
tha t  the mortgage lien is extinguished reason th at  because a
mor tgage r e lease  from an  appa ren t  mor tgagee  tha t  does  not
have fee  t it le i s va lid , t he m or tga ge a lso sh ould be re leased
when  th e ap pa ren t m ort gagee d oes own fee t it le.  H owever , a
cru cial distinction exists between these  two cases . In  the
form er,  the  apparen t  mor tga gee  has g iven  a  wr it t en  rele ase  or
otherwise r eleased the m ort gage of record ; in th e lat ter , it h as
not . Wit h  the com plet en es s of the public property records being
of p r imary  concern , the exi st en ce of a  recor d r ele ase  is  a  cr it ica l
cons idera t ion .
This  cons idera t ion  appa ren t ly  was  de t ermina t ive in  many of
the cases adoptin g the m inority position th at  th e appa ren t
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62. 42 N. Y. 33 4 (18 70).
63. Id . at 338.
64. See i d . at 338-39.
mort gagee’s deed  did  not extinguish th e mort gage. For exam ple,
in  Purd y v. Huntington ,62 th e cour t h eld th at  a bu yer acquir ed
fee t i tle subject to a m ortgage t ha t a ppear ed from th e propert y
records to be owned by th e seller of th e fee title because:
[T h e bu yer ] is t o be ch ar ged  wit h  cons tr u ctiv e n oti c e  of t h e
exi st en ce  of th e m or tg a ge , a n d of t h e  con t in u a n ce  of i t s  l i en ,  by
its  record in  th e pr oper  off ice .  By tha t  h e  w a s  in for m e d  n ot
only  of th e d at e of t h e m ort g a g e,  t he am oun t  secur ed th ereby,
a n d  o f a l l  it s  pa r t icu la r s , b u t  th a t  it  w a s op e n  an d  u n ca n ce le d
of r eco rd ,  and  the r e fore  app a ren t ly  an  ou t s t and ing  l ien  an d
incumbr ance  on  th e  p rem ises  of  wh ich  h e  was  t a k ing  t i t l e .63
However , t h is t ype of s t a tem en t  is  de cep t ive . An
examina t ion  of the r ecordin g st at ut e in  effect at  th e tim e of this
case r evea ls t ha t t he  court  wa s n ot ba sin g its  holdin g on  a
genera l concern  for th e a ccura cy of the property records. Its
holding inst ead r eflects t he limit ed scope of the  record ing
s t a tu t e with  res pect t o mort gage a ssign m ents . Record ing  was
necessa ry to protect a  mort gage ass ignee only from su bsequen t
ass ignees an d not from pu rcha sers  of th e fee t i tle.64 This
di ffer en ce in s t a tut ory coverage  from t he r ecordin g acts  in t he
m a jority  sta tes, wh ich cover pu rcha ses of both  th e fee title an d
the mor tgage , exp la ins  the appa ren t  division bet ween t he
cour t s adop t in g t he m ajor it y posi t ion  and  those  adop t ing  the
minor i ty posit ion. The  division is  cau sed b y a differ ence in  th e
scope  of th e respective st at e recording sta tu tes, r at her  t h a n  by
a  t h eoret ica l or  ph ilos oph ica l d iffer en ce in  the a pp lica t ion  of
similar laws.
But  if th e doctr ine  of mer ger , th e  pu r cha ser’s inqu iries
concern ing the sta tus of t he m or tga ge,  and a na logies  to the
th ird ca tegory of cases are irrelevant in deciding these cases,
how should t hey be decided? As is tr ue for th e other  cat egories
of case s, n otice is t he  det er min at ive fact or. I f t h e  proper ty
pur chaser  does  not h ave a ctua l or  cons t ruct ive  not ice of t he
as s ignmen t , the r ecor ding a ct  wil l t r ea t  the m or tgagee, ra th er
than  th e assign ee, as t he owner  of th e mort gage. As the owner
of th e mort gage an d of th e fee title, the m or t gagee’s deed,
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65. S ee, e.g., McMurtr y v. Bowers, 109 A. 361 (N.J . 192 0); Da nb ur y v. Rob ins on,
14 N. J . E q. 2 13 (1 862 ); Fi rs t N at ’l Ban k v . Br oth er ton , 84  N. E.  794  (Oh io 19 08).
66. 109 A. 36 1 (N .J . 19 20).
whet her  a  wa r ran ty deed or  a  qu it cla im  de ed , wi ll con vey  bot h
interests  to the  purchaser .  In  th i s way, the purch as er is
protected  from a foreclosure. Although a future pur chaser of th e
land migh t  demand  tha t  a mor t g ag e r elease be recorded to
ensu re ma rk et ab le t itle , th e dee d is a s effective a s a  mor tga ge
releas e to p rot ect  t he  innocen t  pu rcha ser ’s  t it l e from the
mort gage.
Of cour se, th e pur chaser  will not be pr otecte d if the  relevan t
record ing act does not apply to mortgage assignments.
However , th is la ck of protect ion is  n ot  u n i que t o the case of a
wrongfu l r e lease  and i s not  a t t r i bu tab le  to a  fl aw in the  theory
tha t  n ot i ce is t he  key t o decidin g th ese ca ses . In st ea d, t he
absence of pr otect ion  st em s fr om a  leg is la t ive  de ter min a t ion
tha t  mor tgage as sign ees n eed n ot r ecord t heir  assign men t t o be
protected from fut ur e pur chaser s of th e fee title.
5. Mortgage as a fraud on creditors
 These cases  a re the  mir ror ima ge of th e fra ud  cases  in  the
first  ca tegor y. While t he fir st  cat egory involved s itu at ions in
which  a lan downer  or mortgagee was frau dulently induced to
convey th e la nd  or m ort gage, respectively, th e case s in  th is
ca tegor y in volve  a  la ndow ner  and m or t g a gee defr au din g th e
owner ’s creditors by creat ing a m ortgage for inad equat e or  no
cons idera t ion . A typical case involves an ow n er  a t t empt ing  to
protect  its  pr oper ty fr om execu tion  by cred itor s by gr an tin g a
l a rge mor tga ge to t he  confeder at e m ort gagee . In  th is wa y, th e
owner  ap pea rs  to h ave  litt le r em ain ing eq uit y in t he  pr oper ty.
When  th e mor tga ge is a ssign ed t o an  as sign e e t ha t  is
unaware of t he  fr aud  on  credi tor s , cou r t s  un iformly hol d t h a t
the assignee takes fr ee  of th e defense.65 For  exam ple, in
McMu rtry v. Bowers,66 Annie B owers owed money t o a variet y
of cred it ors,  one of whom ob ta ined a  judgmen t  li en  aga ins t  her .
A few month s before t he judgm ent  creditor obtain ed th e lien ,
Bower s gave a  mor tga ge on  la nd s he owned  to sa t is fy a  de bt  for
which  sh e wa s n ot pe rs ona lly liable . T h e cou r t  he ld  tha t  the
mor tgage cons t itu ted a  fraud  on  her  credi tor s  because she had
no legal obligation to give it and  because sh e received no
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67. S ee Fi rs t  Nat ’l  Bank  v . Brother ton ,  84  N.E. 794 (Oh io  1908).  The
Ba nk ru pt cy Code has codified this resu lt. Section 550(b)(1) of the Co de  p r ov ides  tha t
the bankr uptcy tru stee ma y not recover a mortgage t hat  const i t u t es  a  fr audu len t
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fai th , and with out knowledge of the voidability of the t r an sfer  avoi ded.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 550 (b)(1) (1 994 ).
68. But see NELSON  & WHIT MAN , supra  note 2, at  385.
69. S ee, e.g., N ea l v. B ra dle y, 3 84 S .W.2 d 2 38 (Ar k.  196 4).
cons idera t ion  for th e tran sfer. Because the  mor tgage  was
ass igned to a b ona  fide  pu rchase r  wit hout  not ice of t he fr aud,
however, th e jun ior jud gmen t lien or  cou ld not  p reven t  it  from
bein g foreclosed on the basis of frau d. The sa me r esult  ha s been
rea ched when  a m ortgage w a s  ch a lle nged  by a  ba nkrupt cy
tr ust ee.67
Th e r at iona le for pr otect ing t he  inn ocent m ort gage h older is
the sa me a s in  th e first cat egory of fra ud cases . To preser ve the
reli abil it y of t he p rope r ty r ecor ds , a  mor tgage assign ee mu st be
protected  from claim s abou t  wh ich  it  did n ot  have a ctua l or
cons t ruct ive not ice. Although, by voluntar ily executing a deed,
the defrau ded owner in t he first cat egory of cases is somewhat
mor e cu lpable th an  th e creditors a lleging a fraud ulent
mor tgage in  th is  s ix th  ca tegory , the  cour t s  have  reached the
cor rect  resu lt in t hese cases  as well. The grea ter  good is served
by protecting those who rely  on the  proper ty  records  and do not
have any other notice of conflicting claims.
6. Mortgage assigned twice
 This  ca t egor y of cases  differs fr om t he ot her s in  a  crucial
r e spect . In  th e oth er  cat egories  of cas es, a  th i rd pa r ty to the
loa n  t r ansa ct ion  wa s d efending t he m or tga ged  la nd fr om a
foreclosure. Even  when  the  cour t  he ld  tha t  the mort gage holder
could not  enforce  the m or t g a ge, t he h older  st ill  could  en force
the note. 68 In  contr as t, t his  cat egory of cases  involves  th e r ight
to en force th e not e, as  well a s the  mor tgage . Both  ass ignees  a re
claim ing title t o the n ot e  a n d t o the  mor tgage  and the  r ight  t o
en force  them.
Desp ite  th is  factua l d iffer en ce, i f the n ote is  nonnegotia ble
or if it  is held by a non-HDC, the an alysis is the same as  for  the
other categories. As in the oth er  ca t egor ies, if t he  re leva nt
record ing act does not include mortgage assignments, the first
a ssignee owns  the  note  and mor tgage .69 On  the othe r  hand,  if
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70. S ee, e.g.,  Gua ran ty Mor tg ag e & I ns . Co.  v. H ar ri s, 1 93 S o. 2d  1 (F la . 19 66);
B lun t  v. Norr is, 123 Ma ss. 55 (187 7); Brooke v. St rut hers , 68 N.W. 272 (Mich. 1896)
(dict um ); Owen  v. Eva ns, 3 1 N.E . 999 (N.Y. 1892); Fann in In v. and  Dev. Co. v.
Neuhau s, 427 S .W.2d  82 (Te x. App . 196 8); In re Ve r m on t  F i ber glass, Inc., 44 B.R. 505
(Bankr . Vt. 1 984); cf. Syra cuse S av. Ba nk  v. Me r rick, 75 N.E. 232 (N.Y. 1905)
(holding  tha t ass ignor’s failure t o deliver bond to second assignee constitut ed
constr uctive  no ti ce of a  pr ior  un re cor de d a ss ign me nt ).
Under  some state recording acts, the subsequent assignee must  r eco rd i t s
a s s ignmen t  before th e pri or a ssi gn ee r ecor ds t o be p rot ect ed fr om t he  pr ior
a s s ignmen t .
71. S ee, e.g., Harris ,  193 So. 2d at 3 (The prior assignee’s fail ur e t o r ecor d
“made  th e s ub se qu en t m ach in at ion s of t he  as sig no r p oss ibl e.”).
72. U.C.C. § 3-30 2(b) (1 990 ).
the recor ding a ct  does inclu de m ort gage a ssign me nt s, a n
ass ignee withou t  actua l or  cons t ruct ive not ice  of a  pr ior
ass ignment  will be p rotect ed from i t.70 The decision in t he lat ter
type of case rest s  on  the  t erms  of the  record ing  act  a lone.
However , som e cou r t s s t a te a s a n  add it ion a l r ea son  for  the
holding th at , as bet ween t wo innocent assign ees,  the p r ior
ass ignee is m ore culp able  becau se it s fa ilu re to record  the
ass ignment  en able d t he a ss ign or ’s w rongfu l r e-a ss ign men t  of
th e note a nd m ortgage. 71
The cour t ’s r eli ance on  th e recording act to decide these
cases i s a  s t r a ight for war d app licat ion of th e usu al ru le tha t a
person acquiring an interest  in  land  ta kes su bject t o all mat ter s
appear ing in  the p ubli c recor ds . Th e d u ty t o check  the r ecords
is not excused because th e assignee also is acqu ir ing a  note .
However , th is du ty, wh ich is so cent ra l in la nd  conveyan cing, is
abr ogated whe n t he n ote is a  negot iable in st rum ent. Because
t i t le to a  negot iable inst rument is at  issue , Article 3 of the U CC
applies. Article 3 expres sly rejects th e notice pr ovided by t he
pu blic re cords: “Pu blic filing or r ecordin g of a d ocument  does
not  of itself const itut e notice of a defense, claim in recoupm ent ,
or  cl a im to the  in s t rumen t .”72
This  st a t u t e could  be  in ter pr et ed  to pr es er ve t he r ele va nce
of the  land  r ecords , r a the r t han  to r eject t hem . It could be
in te rpre t ed to mean tha t, if a prospective assignee i s unaware
tha t  the n ote is  se cured  by a  mor tga ge,  a  recor d ed  m or tgage
“does not  of its elf” pr ovid e con st ruct ive  not ice of i t s e xis t en ce.
Sim ilar ly, if the  as sign or pr eviously had ass ign ed  the s ame n ote
and mor tgage, a  recor de d m or tga ge a ss ign men t  wou ld  not
cons t it u t e not ice of t he pr ior ass ignment  i f the  subsequen t
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owner ship  o f a  no te  tha t  was  pu rchased a ft e r  it s  ma tu r ity :
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Mor ri son , supra note 13, at  297-98.
74. 218 P.  335  (Ok la . 19 23).
75. Id . at 338.
ass ignee is u na war e of the m ort gage’s exist ence. Conver sely, if
a  pr osp ect ive  ass ign ee  knows  abou t  the m or t gage, th e assign ee
must  condu ct a r easona ble investigat ion of title t o the mor tgage
by checkin g the property records.73 If the assignee fails to do so,
it  will be deemed to h ave cons tr uct ive not ice of a p reviou sly
recorded  a ss ignmen t .
Desp ite  the availability of an interpretat ion tha t would at
least pa r t ia l ly  ha rmon ize  the Art i cle 3  prov is ion  with  the
r ecord ing act s,  a t  lea st  one cou r t  has r ejected  any r ole for  t he
land recor ds  in  res olving con flict ing claims to a mortgage. In
Foster  v. A ugu sta nn a College &  T h eological Sem inary ,74 a
mort gagee assigned t he sa me n ote an d mort gage twice. Even
though the fir st  ass ign ee  recor de d i t s a ss ign men t  before t he
ass ignor  gave th e second a ssignm ent , the cou r t  he ld  in  favor  of
the second assignee. The court  held that , be cause  the second
ass ignee ha d n ot exa min ed t he p roper ty r ecords a nd  did  not
have an y othe r a ctu al n otice of the a ssign men t, it  w a s  n ot
subject to the fir st  ass ign ee’s cla im . Th e cou r t  reasoned tha t ,
because  the  note  impar t s i t s negot ia ble  character  to the
mort gage, the p urchase r  of the m or tga ge w as n ot  su bject  to the
recor ding a ct :
I t  m a y  be  obse rved  tha t  t he  doc t r ine  o f cons t r uc t ive  no t i ce  is
ap plica ble  on ly  to  a  pe r so n  wh o is d ea lin g w it h  th e la n d i ts elf,
a n d  sin ce th e pu rch as er  of a n egot iab le  p romisso ry  no te ,
secu red  by a  m ort ga ge, is n ot d ea lin g in  la nd , th er e is n o field
for  t he  o p e r at ion of th e r egist ry la ws in  case s of th is kin d. An
exa m in at ion  of th e a u th orit ies  dis close s t o ou r  s a t is fa c t io n t h a t
t h e doct r ine  o f  cons t ru c t ive  no t i ce  has  n e v er  b e e n  a p p li ed  t o
comm er cial  pa per ; th e t ru e t est  as  to n egot iab le pa per  bein g
t h a t  of g ood  or  b a d fa it h .75
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76. S ee, e.g., Be ne dict ine College, Inc. v. Centu ry Office Prods., Inc., 853 F.
Supp. 1315 (D. Kan. 1994); Dal la s  Bank  & Trust  Co. v. Frigikin g, Inc., 692 S.W.2d
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77. S ee Solo ff v. Dolla hi te , 77 9 S .W.2 d 5 7 (Te nn . App . 19 89).
78. S ee New J ersey Mort gage an d Inv. Corp. v. Calvetti, 171 A.2d 321, 325 (N.J .
Sup. 1961) (“As the rule is generally stated, evidence of bad faith on th e par t  o f t he
ho lde r , and not merely proof of circumsta nces calculated to arouse suspicion, must  be
shown  in or der  to d efea t h is r ecover y on t he  ins tr um en t.”); Frigik ing, I nc.,  692 S.W.2d
a t  166 ( “I t  is  not  su ff ic ien t  t ha t  Da l la s  Bank  had  knowledge  tha t  wou ld  pu t  a
rea sona ble pers on on in quir y which wou ld lead  to discovery.  There mus t  be  ac tua l
kn owledge of facts and circumst ances which amounted t o bad fait h.”); cf. NELSON  &
WHIT MAN , supra  note 2, at  389.
79. S ee U.C.C. § 3-201 (1990 ). S ee CRANDALL ET AL ., supra  note 10, § 16.2.
The Foster case w as  govern ed by t he N egotia ble
Inst rumen ts Law, which was Article 3’s predecessor. However,
cour t s ha ve inter pret ed Article 3’s prov is ion  concern ing  the
publ ic records in t he sa me wa y. Cour ts a pplying Article 3
rout inely hold tha t  th e HDC of a negotiable inst ru men t  cuts off
conflicting  recorded int erest s. Alth ough no report ed case
involves conflict ing claims  to a m ortgage, courts  ha ve applied
Art icle 3  to cu t  off per fected  secur i ty in teres t s in  pe rsona l
p roper ty76 and  a  recorded  s ta te t ax  li en .77 Moreover , cou r t s
r egu lar ly hold tha t  an as sign ee can  at ta in H DC st at us  even if it
fails  to condu ct a  rea sona bly pru dent  inquir y concern ing tit le to
th e not e a nd  its  secu rit y.78
On it s fa ce, t h is  res u lt  is  complet ely  cont ra ry t o the
fundamenta l prin ciple tha t  a  pu rchase r  acqu ir es  t it le t o a
pr ope r ty in ter es t  su bject  to a l l ma t te r s  of which  i t  has actua l  or
cons t ruct ive not ice. But  Article 3 has n ot rejected th e
contr olling import an ce of notice. Rat her , it ha s chosen an
alt er na tive  sour ce of not ice th at  is m ore efficien t  for  the
negot iable  inst ruments  mark e t —possess ion  of the  note . The
p u rchaser of a note  qua lifies as  an  HD C only by ta kin g
posses sion of th e note.79 If the a ssignor cann ot deliver the n ote,
the prospective ass ignee cann ot be an H DC because it has
not ice tha t  the  ass ignor  may  not  own t he n ote. Conver sely, if
the ass ign or  de liver s p oss es sion , th e as sign ee is  an  HD C an d is
protected  from  t h ird -par ty claim s of owners hip . By pr otectin g
possess ion , Art icle  3 fr ees n ote p urchasers from the  burden  of
checkin g th e public records  an d ma king oth er inqu iries
concern ing t i t le , which  cle a r ly fa cili t a t es  the m arket  for
negotiable instr ument s.
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80. 8 Mich . 39 5 (18 60).
81. Id . at 402.
82. 137 N. E. 2d  532  (Oh io 19 56).
83. Id . at  535. 
Because  Ar t i cle 3  a ffords  th is  p rotect ion  to the  purch a ser  of
a  negot iab le in st ru me nt , tit le t o th e m ort gage s ecur ing t he
inst rument mu st be pr otected as well. Oth erwise,  Ar t icle 3
could vest title  to t he  negot iab le in st ru me nt  in on e per son, a nd
the re cordin g act  would vest tit le to the m ortgage in a  differen t
per son . Th is  res u lt  is  unaccep table  because  a  mor tga ge ca nnot
exist  or be enforced ind epen den t of th e debt . Ther efore, un like
the oth er ca ses d iscus sed in  th is Art icle, th is one t ype of case is
govern ed by the U CC, rat her  than  by t he la nd laws . In  th is  one
case, th e mort gage’s iden tit y is comple te ly su bsu me d by t he
note’s.
B. Excep ti ons a nd  Ap pa ren t E xcep ti ons
 Despit e their  usu a l con cer n  for  the r ecor ding acts, cour t s
sometim es us e lan g u age tha t  indica tes  tha t  a  mor tgage
ass ignee ta kes free of all third -part y defenses, even if it  had
not ice of t he  de fense  from the  proper ty record s. For  exam ple, in
Bloom er v.  Henderson ,80 t he  Mich igan  Supreme Cou r t  had  to
dete rmine wh et he r a  mor tga ge as sign ee  t ook  the  mor tgage
subject to a t hird  par ty’s defense of fra ud. The court  reject ed
the de fen se , r ely in g on  the com mon la w of con t ract s: “[T]he
ass ignee of a  chose  in  act ion  t akes i t  sub ject  t o all equities
exist ing between  the p ar t ies  to the inst rument , bu t  not  to any
la tent  equ ities which some third person may have against th e
d eb t or , or  pa r ty bound  by  the  in s t rumen t .”81 Sim ilar ly, in
Anchor Loan Co. v. Willett,82 wh ich  in volve d a n  HDC of a
negotiable instr ument , the court stat ed:
T h is  Cour t  r eaches  th e  conc lus ion  th a t  Anchor  Loan  w as  a
h olde r  i n  due  cour se  o f  t he  nego t i ab le  p romissory  no te  an d  a s
s u ch  is en tit le d  to  a l l  t he  r igh t s  o f  a  ho lde r  i n  due  cour se  and
t h a t  s a id  cha tt el m ort ga ge w as  in cide n t t o th e p rom iss ory  n ote
a n d  wou ld b e s u bje ct  t o n o e q u i t ie s  t h a t  t h e  o r ig in a l  n o t e  wa s
n ot  su bje ct t o. In  th is in st a n t ca se  th e C ou rt  fin ds  n o fact
w h ich  w ou ld  h a v e  b ee n  a  d e fe n s e  in  a  s u i t  u p on  t h e
p romisso ry  no te .83
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84. 23 B.R. 410 (Ba nk r. S.D .N.Y. 1982). 
85. Id . at 413.
86. A ha nd ful  of cas es i n ot he r ju ri sdi ction s h ave  followed  th e N ew Yor k
approach , bu t a ll h ave  bee n r epu dia te d or  dis tin gu ish ed t o vir tu al e xti nct ion.
In  ea ch  of thes e ca se s,  the cou r t  ba se d i t s h old in g on  the
difficulty of discoverin g th ird -par ty d efens es. H owever , th e
quoted  lan gua ge goes beyond t his  expresse d concern  by st at ing
tha t  the ass ign ee  takes  free  of a ll t h ir d-p ar ty defense s a nd n ot
just th ose of which it h ad n o notice. More over, t he qu oted
language stat es a b roader  ru le than was  necessa ry  to decide  the
case be fore t he  court . In  ea ch cas e, th e a ssign ee did  not  ha ve
a ctua l or  const ruct ive  not ice of t he d efense . Th er efor e, t o the
extent  tha t  the cou r t s’ st a t em en ts indica te t ha t  a ll t h ir d-p a r ty
defenses  ar e bar red even  if the  as sign ee h ad  not ice, th ey sh ould
be  t r ea ted  as t hough t les sly cr ea ted  dictum.
Because la nd law is  left  to the a lm ost  exclusive p rovin ce of
the stat es, at least one stat e usually marches to a differ en t
d rummer . Wit h  res pe ct  t o t h ird -pa r ty defen ses, N ew York’s la w
is the excep t ion  to the ot herwise virtu ally univer sal r ule. New
York ’s law is th e complet e opposit e of the s ta tem ent s of law in
the two p r ior  case s, a nd it  is equa lly erroneous. Rat her  th an
holding tha t  mor tgage a ssignees take free of all third-party
defenses, New York  cour ts h old tha t a ssignees t ak e subject  t o
a l l su ch  de fen se s,  eve n  in  the a bs en ce of not ice. For exa mp le, in
In  re Levine,8 4  th e cour t h eld tha t a  mortga ge assignee was
subject to a  th ird  pa rt y’s defen se even  th ough t he a ssign ee  had
no actu a l or  const ru ctive notice of it: “[N]ot only is an  assign ee
subject  to t he  equ itie s or d efens es in  favor of th e m ort gagor , he
is also subject to any latent equities that m a y  exi st  in  favor  of
u n known th ird  pa rt ies.”85 Th is  lega l con clu sion  is  ba se d on  the
det erm ina tion  th at  a m ort gage a ssign ee can a cquire no grea ter
r igh t s than  the  or igina l mor t g a gee; becau se th e mortga gee was
subject  to th e defense in t ha t case, so is th e assign ee. The New
York  ru le is well-ent ren ched, but  perhaps the  cour t s event ua lly
will yie ld  to the r ea lit ies  of the m oder n s econda ry m ort gage
ma rk et  and  protect  mor tgage a ss ign ees fr om de fen se s of w hich
th ey ha d n o notice a nd  no r ea sona ble m ea ns  of discovery.86
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V. CO N C L U S I O N
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 In  cases involving a  th i rd pa r ty’s  defense t o a  m or t g a ge,
not ice is th e key cr it er ion . If t he m or tga ge h older  had a ctua l or
cons t ruct ive not ice of t h e defense when it acquired the
mor tgage, it t ook s ubject  to the defen se . Con ver se ly, i f the
h older  did n ot  have n ot ice,  it  took t he m or tga ge fr ee  of th e
defense. When title to a secured negotiable instr umen t  is  a t
issue,  not ice is  defined by Art icle 3 of th e UCC In ever y other
case, n ot ice is defined by th e land  laws a nd, in pa rt icular, by
the jurisdiction’s recording act. In thos e  ca ses , d is t in ct ion s
between  negotiable a nd nonnegotiable instr ument s, HDCs and
non-HDCs, r eal  a n d persona l defenses, an d pat ent  an d lat ent
equ ities  are irrelevant. These commercial law distinctions are
re leva nt  only when det erm ining defenses t o enforcemen t  of th e
secured  deb t . When  a  cour t  en te r s  th i s commercia l l aw
labyr int h  to decide is su es  concer n in g t it le t o land or  t o a
mortgage, the court —and land titles—are lost.
